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WIRETAPPING: THE FEDERAL LAW
Wiretapping is primarily a tool of law enforce-
ment agencies, and thus the majority of federal
cases on the subject are concerned with attempts
by defendants in criminal prosecutions to procure
the exclusion of evidence obtained by wiretapping.
Evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment is inadmissible in federal courts.' The
applicability of the fourth amendment to evidence
obtained through the use of wiretap apparatus was
first presented to the United States Supreme Court
in Olmstead v. United States.2 The Olmstead case
involved a federal conspiracy prosecution in which
the substance of a wiretapped telephone conversa-
tion was admitted in evidence. In a five to four
decision, the Court held that the evidence was not
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.3
The majority decision relied on three basic
grounds. First, the Court held that there was no
trespass involved inasmuch as the evidence was
obtained merely by listening. Thus, there was no
search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment.4 Second, the Court indicated that the con-
versants intended that their voices leave the
I Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2277 U.S. 438 (1928).
'The court ignored a Washington statute making
wiretapping a misdemeanor. The disregard for state law
was probably based on the fact that the case was on the
federal level. The evidence was neither unconstitution-
ally seized nor taken in violation of federal law.
4 It has been suggested that this rationale is some-
what supported by analogous cases, e.g., use of a flash-
light or binoculars to aid sight is certainly not a viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. Rosenzweig, The Law
of Wire Tapping, 32 CoRNEr- L. Q. 514, 530 (1947).
confines of the room, and therefore the communica-
tion was no longer protected by the fourth amend,
ment. Finally, and apparently most important
the Court relied on the literal language of the
fourth amendment. The amendment refers spe-
cifically to searches and seizures of "persons,
houses, papers, and effects." Therefore, reasoned
the Court, intangibles, such as oral communica-
tions, were not intended to be within the protection
of the amendment. The majority concluded by in-
dicating that Congressional legislation was the
only means by which wiretap evidence could be
excluded.
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Holmes refused to apply
the fourth amendment to the situation. However,
it was his opinion that the common law rule of
evidence was overthrown by Weeks v. United
States6 and that logical extension of the exclusion-
ary rule resulted in exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of a statute as well as that obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment.7 Holmes' now
' The Court distinguished the protection afforded
mails by the fourth amendment from telephone conver-
sations by referring to the constitutional provision es-
tablishing the Post Office and the protection afforded
by it.
8 Supra note 1.
7 An analogy may be drawn from McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1942), where the Court
pointed out that constitutional rights are not the sole
determinant of the admissibility of evidence. Rosen-
zweig, supra note 4, at 553. It must be noted, however,
that the McNabb case involved FED. R. Cmx. P. 5(a),
whereas the Olmstead case involved a state statute.
Thus, the question is resolved into whether the federal
courts should take cognizance of a state statute.
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famous phrase epitomizes the view of the minority:
"I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the Government should play an
ignoble part."s
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a well reasoned dissent,
pointed out that though wiretapping is not pro-
hibited by the letter of the amendment, it is ob-
viously a violation of its spirit.'
It has been suggested that the Olinstead decision
was based primarily upon policy considerations. 0
If the Court had determined that wiretapping was
a violation of the fourth amendment, the use of
such evidence would hav6 been automatically pie-
duded in criminal prosecutions. Thus, the Court's
holding left Congress free to provide for that de-
gree of exclusion which it, in its legislative wisdom,
deemed proper. However, no legislation was forth-
coming, and the Olmstead case was the federal
precedent in the wiretap area for nearly a decade."
During this period, law enforcement agencies
utilized the freedom afforded by the Court to full
advantage.n In 1935 and 1936 federal agents in-
vestigating alcohol smuggling in New York tapped
a suspect's telephone line and listened in on ap-
proximately 500 calls. Seventy-two of these calls
were placed in evidence in a prosecution for viola-
tion of the federal prohibition law. At first blush,
this appeared to be one more case within the scope
of the Olmstead holding. However, the defendant's
' 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
' The framers of the Constitution designed its lan-
guage to cover the needs of the day. Naturally, the in-
vention of the telephone as a means of communication
was unforeseen.
10GRENiw, WR-TArPNG: ITS RELATION TO
C nvm rn Ies 30 (1938).
The Court could have determined that wiretapping
is an illegal search and seizure, but that warrants for the
purpose of tapping may be issued upon "probablecause" as required by the fourth amendment. In the
case of search and seizurethe Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide a workable standard for probable
causi. Flu. R. Caiu P. 41(b). In the area of wiretap-
ping such an approach would create numerous prob-
lems. For example, determination of the subject of the
search and the limitation of the tapping would be dif-
ficult because a wiretap will reveal information not only
in relation to the subject under investigation but con-
cerning all matters discussed over the telephone. In
addition, if notice of the tap is required to be given to
the suspect, he will doubtless refrain from discussing
any questionable matters on the telephone.
" Bushouse v. United States, 67 F.2d 843 (6th Cir.
1933), and Smith v. United States, 91 F.2d 556 (D.C.
Cir. 1937), were decided on the basis of Olmstead.
A discussion of proposed legislation may be found in,
Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem; An Analysis and a
Legislat Proposal, 52 CoLvw. L. Rav. 165, 172-74
(1952).
"Bradley & Hogan, Wiretapping: From Nardone to
Benaxti and Ratkbun, 46 GEo. L. J. 418, 421 (1958).
resourceful lawyer seized upon the language of a
statutory provision which, theretofore, had not
been regarded as applicable to such a situation:
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act."
The case, Nardone v. United States,14 reached the
Supreme Court before the defendant's contention
was accepted.
After reviewing the government's argument in
relation to Congressional intent, i.e., that Section
605 was not designed to deal with wiretapping, the
Court stated:
"We nevertheless face the fact that the plain
words of §605 forbid anyone, unless authorized
by. the sender, to intercept a telephone message,
and direct in equally dear language that 'no
person' shall divulge or publish the message or its
substance to 'any person.' To recite the contents
of the message in testimony before a court is to
divulge the message. The conclusion that the
Act forbids such testimony seems to us unshaken
by the government's arguments." 5
The Court determined that both the interception
and divulgence prohibitions of Section 605 were
violated, and that the evidence must be excluded.
The government argued in the alternative that
the statute was applicable to private persons only
and not to law enforcement officers. This conten-
s "... no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or pub-
lish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person; and no person not being entitled thereto, and no
person having received such intercepted communication
or having become acquainted with the contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any
part thereof, knowing that such information was so ob-
tained shall divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or use the same or any infor-
mation therein contained for his own benefit or for the
benefit of another not entitled thereto .... " 48 Stat.
1103 (1934); 47 U.S. C. §605 (1959).
In Beard v. United States, 82 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1936),
wiretap evidence was admitted on the basis of Olmstead
without reference to Section 605. In Smith v. United
States, 91 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1937), it was contended
that Section 605 was applicable, but the contention was
summarily dismissed.
"4 302 U.S. 379 (1937). In Nardone the government
argued that Section 605 was merely intended to transfer
authority over communications to the F.C.C. Most
authorities have subsequently agreed. E.g., Rosenzweig,
supra note 4, at 536; Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the
Law, 24 CoRNFL L. Q. 337, 366 (1939); Note, 53
HAZv. L. REv. 863, 865 (1940); Westin supra note 11,
at -174; Comment, 49 J. CML L., C. & P. S. 342, 343
(1958). For a discussion of its applicability see Hearings
Before the Sub-Committee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, at 202 (1958).
is 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937).
[Vol. 51
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tion was also rejected, again upon the exact lan-
guage of the statute.
16
Although there seems to he general agreement
that Section 605 was never intended by Congress
to create an evidentiary rule of such far-reaching
significance, 17 it seems unlikely that after over
twenty years of application to wiretap cases the
Court will now reverse its position. Therefore, it
would appear to be more profitable to determine
how the Court has applied the statute rather than
to dwell upon whether it should have been applied
at all.
Section 605 requires both illegal interception and
divulgence. Construction of the term interception
has caused the federal courts great difficulty. The
main source of confusion is the fact that the statute
was not written with intent to control telephone
wiretapping. This view was implied by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Polakoff,19 a case
involving the use of an extension telephone as a
method of obtaining evidence. The statute requires
the authorization of the.sender before the intercep-
tion can be considered lawful. Thus, in this context,
two problems are immediately suggested. Who is a
sender, and is the use of an extension an intercep-
tion within the meaning of the Act? Judge Hand
concluded:
"The word, sender, in §605 is less apt for a tele-
phone talk than a telegram.... Each party is
alternately sender and receiver and it would
deny all significance to the privilege created by
§605 to hold that because one party originated
the call he had power to surrender the other's
privilege.... Anyone intercepts a message to
whose intervention as a listener the communi-
cants do not consent; the means he employs can
have no importance; it is the breach of privacy
that counts. ' 20
16Mr. Justice Sutherland, joined by Mr. Justice
McReynolds, the only justices remaining from the ma-
jority in the Olmstead decision, dissented on the theory
that the word "person" in the statute was inapplicable
to federal officers under the rule of statutory construc-
tion that general words are not sufficient to bind the
government. The reference must be specific. The ma-
jority espoused the view that this principle was not
applicable to the statute here involved but instead ap-
plied another canon of construction: "the sovereign is
embraced by general words of a statute intended to pre-
vent injury and wrong." 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937).
17 Supra note 13.
Is Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) inti-
mates this conclusion. If the Act were construed to pro-
hibit either interception or divulgence, the same result
would occur since, without divulgence in some form the
interception will be unknown.
19 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940).20 Id. at 889.
This approach suggests that the privacy of the
telephone as a means of communication is to be
protected and that listening in is an interception.
Evidence obtained through use of extension
phones was excluded by some and accepted by
other federal courts.n This divergence of views
prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari
in Rathbun v. United States.22 The case involved a
prosecution for transmitting an interstate message
threatening murder. The police, with consent of
the person being called, listened in on a regularly
used extension telephone and utilized the substance
of the conversation as evidence in the prosecution.
The Court held that this was not a violation of
Section 605.
Three grounds were given for the holding. First,
the Court: made a point of the fact that the consent
of one of the parties was given.2n Unlike Judge
Hand's approach, the "consent" analysis is based
on the theory that the message, rather than a
right of privacy, is to be protected.
In the final analysis, the "consent" approach
seems to be reasonable. The person giving his con-
sent could testify as to the contents of the message.
That he consents to allow an officer or a recording
to do it for him seems to be a logical extension of
the principle.2
The other two bases for the Court's decision in
the Rathbun case seem unimportant. Whether there
Cases holding use of an extension without the con-
sent of both parties a violation of Section 605: Reit-
meister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947);
James v. United States, 191 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 948 (1952); United States v. Gul-
ler, 101 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1951). See to the con-
trary: United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970 (D.D.C.
1950); rev'd. on other grounds, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir.
1950); United States v. Pierce, 124 F. Supp. 264 (N.D.
Ohio 1954), affd, 224 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1954); Flan-
ders v. United States, 222 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1955).
a 355 U.S. 107 (1957).23 A later court of Appeals case held that where a
police telephone and extension were used there was no
violation of Section 605 even though the police listened
with the acquiescence rather than at the request of one
of the conversants, as was the situation in the Rathbun
case. Ladrey v. Comm'n, 261 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 920 (1958). The dissent expressed
the view that the holding was inconsistent with Ralh-
bun. However, the silence of the person here would seem
to indicate an implied consent. In United States v. Bar-
bour, 164 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1958), evidence obtained
by an officer listening in on an extension while a special
agent called the defendant at the officer's suggestion
was also admitted.
24 There is some question as to whether consent given
subsequent to the wiretap is sufficient. Weiss v. United
States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939), excluded such evidence not
because the consent came after the wiretap, but because
the consent was involuntary. Bernstein, The Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree, 37 ILL. L. REv. 99, 117 (1942).
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is a regularly used extension or whether the ex-
tension is installed for the purpose of listening to a
specific conversation would not seem to be a ra-
tional ground on which to base a determination of
whether the statute is violated. This is especially
true in view of the Court's last point, that a caller
must run the risk of being overheard if the person
whom he is calling is equipped with an extension
telephone. If one of the parties is said to volun-
tarily subject himself to this risk it should make no
difference whether the phone is installed for the
purpose of listening in or for normal use.
Another difficulty in attempting to define the
term interception arises in eavesdropping situa-
tions, i.e., where electronic devices which require
no direct contact with telephone equipment are
used. Generally, where a police officer listens with-
out the aid of an extension or wiretap device, the
use of such evidence is not regarded by the courts
as a violation of Section 605.25 Even where the con-
sent of neither party is obtained, such evidence
has been held admissible.26 This pattern of the
25 In Rayson v. United States, 238 F.2d 160, 163 (9th
Cir. 1956), the court pointed out:
"It was not interception within the meaning of the
statute for another person to listen to what is said
through a receiver in the hand of the person to whom
the sender is talking. The conversation is completed
when heard and not intercepted before it reaches the
person to whom it is addressed."
However, in United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), the court excluded recorded evidence
similarly obtained on the ground that the defendant
had not consented to the listening in. It would seem
that use of an induction coil where no contact with the
wire is necessary constitutes an interception if made
other than at either end of the line with consent of one
of the conversants. In People v. Malotte, 46 Cal. 2d
59, 292 P.2d 517 (1956), use of such a method was not
considered interception because it was used at the re-
ceiver's end and at his instigation. However, in United
States v. Guller, 101 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1951)
the court pointed out: "The interception forbidden by
Section 605 of the Communications Act... must be by
some mechanical interposition in the transmitting
apparatus itself, that is the interjection of an independ-
ent receiving device between the lips of the sender and
the ear of the receiver." A broad construction of this
language would seem to justify the conclusion that use
of an induction coil would result in an interception
within the meaning of the Act.
26 United States v. Bookie, 229 F.2d 130 (7th Cir.
1956), involved a situation in which a police officer
directed an arrested person to answer his telephone and
hold the receiver so that the officer could hear the con-
versation. The court allowed the evidence thereby ob-
tained to be admitted. In Billed v. United States, 184
F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950), an officer in a raid upon a
lottery answered the phone himself and listened. This
evidence was held admissible in the prosecution of the
defendant.
The cases cited in this and the previous footnote were
cited in the Ratlhbun case in illustrating the conflict on
courts' decisions in defining interception is not sur-
prising in light of an earlier holding in Goldman v.
United StatesY There, the Supreme Court held that
use of an electronic device known as a detectaphone
was not an interception within the meaning of the
statute, since interception refers to "seizure by
way or before arrival at the destined place." 9 The
Court also indicated that the fourth amendment
was inapplicable because no trespass occurred.29
The problems raised by the technicality of the
Court's distinctions were illustrated by United
States v. Coplon,30 where the district court held
evidence inadmissible "because of the failure of the
government to disclose how the microphone was
installed and in what way it differed, if at all, from
a wiretap."'" The formalistic reasoning required by
the Goldman case has been severely criticized,n
but the fact remains that the origin of the diffi-
culty must be attributed to the attempt to apply a
statute to a situation never intended to be within
its purview.Y
As previously indicated, the Nardone case ex-
cluded evidence upon the basis that admission
would constitute a divulgence which the statute
prohibited. In 1939 a second Nardone caseu reached
the Supreme Court. The same defendants were in-
the issue of the effect of consent. These cases, however,
are distinguishable since an extension was utilized in
none of them.
v 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
2 Id. at 134.
29 This is the same basis for denial of the fourth
amendment contention that was propounded in the
Olmstead case. Presumably, a trespass without a war-
rant would constitute an illegal "search" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment and be a violation
thereof, for the fourth amendment is apparently con-
strued to prohibit either illegal search or seizure. United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Thus, the finding
of a trespass may be sufficient to bring the tap within
the prohibition of the fourth amendment. Of course
some evidence must be obtained before the problem
would arise. Even though such evidence may not be re-
garded as "seized" in terms of the fourth amendment,
one element-the illegal search-may be sufficient to
procure exclusion.
In United States v. Silverman, 166 F. Supp. 838,
(D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960), an
electronic eavesdropping device was used requiring a
wire projecting several inches into the party wall. The
defendant argued that there was a -trespass. The dis-
trict court stated at 841:
"It would be, in the opinion of the Court, almost
ludicrous to draw a line of distinction between le-
gality and illegality on such minute circumstances.
Moreover, the Court does not feel that inserting a
wire into a party wall actually constitutes a trespass."
30 88 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
31 Id. at 924.
n Westin, supra note 11, at 180.
,3 Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 552.
24308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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volved, and the government had simply obtained
further evidence through use of the wiretapped
conversations, but did not attempt to submit the
substance of the communications in evidence. The
Court, in the spirit of the first Nardone decision,
held that the evidence obtained through an illegal
interception may be used neither directly nor in-
directly. However, if it can be shown that the evi-
dence was independently obtained, it will be'ad-
missible, even though a wiretap has taken place.35
The opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
cited Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States," in
which the Court had held that derivative evidence
must be excluded when the original source of such
evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment. Thus, on the suject of derivative evi-
dence, the fourth amendment and Section 605 were
held to be co-extensive.
An attempt to determine what constitutes for-
bidden use of derivative evidence necessitates a
review of cases based upon the rationale of the
second Nardone decision.P
In Monroe v. United States,8 it was held that use
of recordings to refresh the memory of one of the
conversants was not error irrespective of whether
the recording was an interception within the mean-
ing of Section 605. It has been suggested that this
use of such evidence is not a violation of the spirit
of the second Nardone case because the ostensible
purpose of the exclusionary rule is the prevention
of violations of the Act and it is highly unlikely
that illegal taps will be made with the object of
using them to refresh a conversant's recollection.1
In addition, this is not derivative evidence in the
sense that the witness' testimony is derived
through the wiretap evidence, unless the witness
was discovered as a result of the wiretap."
"It is not reversible error to admit the wiretapped
evidence if it is merely cumulative, as where a recording
and one of the conversants' testimony are both ad-
mitted in evidence. United States v. Reed, 96 F.2d
785 (2d Cir. 1938) cert. denied, 305 U.S. 612 (1938).
251 U.S. 385 ?1920).
'Another aspect of the "divulgence" problem is the
relation between the federal government and the states
in obtaining and admitting wiretapped evidence in a
judicial proceeding. It has been held that the exclu-
sionary rule imposed by the first Nardone interpretation
of Section 605 is not imposed upon the state courts.
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
38234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
872, rehearing denied, 352 U.S. 937 (1956).
"Bernstein, supra note 24, at 105.
40 Thus, derivative evidence may be defined as that
evidence which is originally obtained through use of the
wiretap. A collateral use such as refreshing a witness'
memory is not a derivative use of the wiretap. It may
be noted that where wiretap evidence was obtained and
One prosecution use of illegally tapped conversa-
tions which has caused difficulty is the attempt to
persuade a party or person alluded to in the con-
versation to become a government witness. This
was the situation in Weiss v. United States.4' The
Court, in excluding the testimony, held that lawful
consent to divulgence must be voluntaryi and not
coerced.
In the Weiss case, the defendant was a party to
the tapped conversation which was sought to be
used indirectly by the prosecution. However, in
Goldstein v. United States4' the defendant against
whom such induced testimony was used was not a
party to the conversation. Using the fourth amend-
ment decisions as their guide, the Court in Goldstein
used in a prosecution prior to 1934 (the date of passage
of the Federal Communications Act), a republication of
such evidence in a post 1934 trial is not a violation of
Section 605. United States v. Costello, 247 F.2d 384
(2d Cir. 1957). After passage of Section 605, presumably
each divulgence would constitute a violation, although
there seems to be no authority on the issue.
A recording of an illegally wiretapped cdhversation
is inadmissible in court even for the purpose of impeach-
ing a witness. James v. United States, 191 F.2d 472-
(D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 948 (1952).
41308 U.S. 321 (1939). This decision was handed
down the same day as the second Nardone case. Another
troublesome question laid to rest by the Weiss decision
was whether Section 605 was applicable to intra as well
as interstate communications. Several circuit courts had
held that the statute was inapplicable to intrastate
communications. Valli v. United States, 94 F.2d 687
(1st Cir. 1938); United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921
(2d Cir. 1939). Other circuit courts concluded that in-
trastate communications were also within the purview
of Section 605, Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F.2d
183 (3d Cir. 1938); Diamond v. United States, 108
F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1938). In rejecting the government's
contention, the Supreme Court held that Section 605
must be construed to apply to intra as well as interstate
communications. The basis of this decision was the fact
that the two clauses of §605 which the Court regarded
as relating to wiretapping, (i.e., the second and fourth
clauses), used the terms "any communication" and
"such communication", whereas the other clauses re-
ferred to "interstate and foreign communications". The
Court concluded that this use of language must have
been intended to include intrastate wiretapping. There
was sound policy underlying this theory. It is virtually
impossible to separate intra from interstate calls in the
wiretapping process. Westin, supra note 11, at 176.
The Court was undoubtedly correct in its interpreta-
tion of the statute, not because Congress foresaw the
difficulty in identifying intrastate phone calls, but be-
cause the intended subject of the Act was the telegraph
system, a subject clearly of interstate character.
It has been suggested that the only telephone com-
munications now beyond the coverage of the Act are
those of the intraoffice variety, over which Congress
could have no authority. Rosenzweig, supra note 4 at
542.
4 316U.S. 114 (1942).
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concluded that a person could not assert another's
rights under the statute, even for his own benefit.3
Mr. Justice Murphy, joined by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in dissenting, pointed out that the
majority's decision was inconsistent with the
second Nardone case. The dissenters insisted that
the policy underlying the Nardone case was a pre-
vention of the use of illegally obtained evidence.
Therefore, it should be immaterial who objects to
the introduction of such evidence. The majority
of the Court, however, balked at extending the
statutory protection beyond the protection
afforded by fourth amendment cases. In so doing,
it lost sight of the divergent purposes of the pro-
visions. The fourth amendment was designed to
protect a personal right, while Section 605, by the
Court's own interpretation, protects the means of
communication, rather than the individual.U The
statute does not create a personal right or privilege,
and therefore assertion of a violation of Section
605 should not be limited solely to a participant
in the tapped conversation.
Another facet of the second Nardone case was
the procedure it provided for discovering the use of
derivative evidence. In order to save time at the
trial, there was to be a pretrial hearing. No motion
to suppress would be allowed during the trial un-
less the defendant had had no earlier opportunity
to make such a motion.
The Court defined the approach as follows:
"The burden is ... on the accused in the first
instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction
that wire-tapping was unlawfully employed.
Once that is established... the trial judge must
give opportunity... to the accused to prove
that a substantial portion of the case against
him was a fruit of the poisonous tree." 45
Thus the so-called "Nardone hearings" were born.
Subsequent courts, however, have found the pro-
cedure extremely difficult to apply.
The defendant's first burden is showing that a
wiretap in fact took place. This, in itself, is often
extremely difficult. The defendant may be com-
1 A person may not assert another's constitutional
right against illegal search and seizure. Ingram v.
United States, 113 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1940). The Gold-
stein holding was contrary to dictum of an earlier Court
of Appeals decision. United States v. Bernava, 95 F.2d
310 (2d Cir. 1938).
"Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133
(1942), handed down the same day as the Goldstein case
pointed out that, "The protection intended and afforded
by the statute is of the means of communication and not
of the secrecy of the conversation."
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
pletely unaware that his telephone had been
tapped. Circumstantial evidence of tapping is in-
sufficient. 6 Although some federal courts seem to
place a heavier burden upon the defendant than
others, generally the motion for a hearing must re-
quest suppression of specific evidence. 0 Even where
a former hearing has led to the suppression of de-
rivative evidence, the court may refuse to grant a
hearing in a subsequent prosecution unless the
defendant can show that a substantial part of the
new indictment is based upon the evidence
formerly suppressed. Denial of a motion for pre-
liminary hearing does not prejudice the right of the
defendant to object to the admission of evidence
during the trial, if it appears at that time to be the
product of illegally intercepted messages. 49
If the *defendant is successful in establishing the
fact of the wiretap, the burden shifts to the pros-
ecution to show that the evidence to be presented
had an origin independent of the wiretap. The fact
that identical evidence was obtained by both legal
and illegal methods will not prevent admission of
the former. 50 In order to prove an independent
source the prosecution must usually reveal the
evidence to be used at the trial thereby damaging
its planned trial strategy."
It has been suggested that this problem may be
circumvented by requiring the prosecution to sub-
mit a summary of evidence and a statement of its
source to the trial judge. Only the evidence which
the judge concludes might be tainted would be re-
vealed to the defendant. This procedure would not
46 Price, The Admissibility of Wiretap Evidence in the.
Federal Courts, 14 U. MIAmI L. Rxv. 57, 69 (1959).
nAn affidavit filed by the government to the effect
that none of the evidence was a result of wiretapping
was held sufficient to deny a hearing where the defend-
ant simply made general allegations, unsupported by
proof. United States v. Frankfeld, 100 F. Supp. 934
(D. Md. 1951).
"United States v. Pillon, 36 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.N.Y.
1941), involved a third prosecution. In two former pro-
secutions government evidence had been suppressed.
The court denied a pre-trial hearing, pointing out that
it was highly improbable that the government would
rely on incompetent evidence for the third time.
In United States v. Costello, 171 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.
N.Y. 1959), the court concluded that the interception of
telephone messages relating to a purely collateral matter
which precipitated an investigation was not a sufficient
basis for excluding admissions of his criminal activities
in-other fields.
4 United States v. Frankfeld, 100 F. Supp. 934
(D. Md. 1951).
10United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C.
1950), rev'd. on other grounds, 191. F.2d 749 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
51 Bernstein, supra note 24, at 100.
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prevent an inquiry into the source of evidence after
the trial has begun.1
2
Where the defendant proves that wiretaps have
been made, the judge cannot allow them to be with-
heldfrom the defendant throughout the proceeding,
even on the basis of national security. In United
States v. Coploni,2 the trial judge sought to so with-
hold evidence. However, the Court of Appeals
held that the prosecution must release the contents
of the wiretap and prove that its evidence was in-
dependently obtained 4 Thus, such evidence must
be revealed or the prosecution will fail.
In certaincases this may lead to an inconsistency
with the requirements of the Congressional legisla-
tion55 passed in modification of Jencks v. United
States."' For example, if during the trial the de-
fendant moves for government reports relating to
a witness' testimony, and these reports relate to a
wiretap, then under the Jencks statute the govern-
ment may allege that such reports are irrelevant
to the testimony. If the judge agrees, he may al-
low the government to withhold such reports. Pre-
sumably, in the "Nardone hearings" the govern-
ment would still have the burden of showing that
the evidence used was of an independent origin.
The Coplon case seems to require that an entire
disclosure of taps and reports is essential, since the
burden is on the government to show that the evi-
dence was independently derived. Nevertheless,
EId. at 101.
53 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950).
" Id. at 637. The government might refuse to reveal
the information on the ground that such divulgence
would constitute a violation of Section 605. However,
such a disclosure seems not to be so regarded by the
Court.
55 "(b) After witness called by the United States has
testified on direct examination, the court shall, on mo-
tion of the defendant, order the United States to pro-
duce any statement... of the witness in the possession
of the United States which relates to the subject matter
as to which the witness has testified....
(c) If the United States claims that any statement or-
dered to be produced under this section contains matter
which does not relate to the subject matter of the testi-
mony of the witness, the court shall order the United
States to deliver such statement for the inspection of
the court in camera .... the court shall excise the por-
tions ... which do not relate to the ... testimony of
the witness. With such material excised, the court shall
then direct delivery of such statement to the defendant
for his use....
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an
order of the court ... the court shall strike from the
record the testimony of the witness .... " 71 Stat. 595
(1957), 18 U.S.C. §3500 (1958).
56 353 U.S. 657 (1956). Under the terms of the statute
the issue would arise only during the trial. An examina-
tion of its legislative history seems to indicate that this
statute was not considered in relation to such situations.
1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & An NEws 1861.
the express language of the Jencks statute would
seem to prevail over the case law in relation to the
"Nardone hearings," since the former is a legisla-
tive directive.
In 1941, two years after the second Nardone de-
cision, the Department of Justice announced its
rather startling position that since it considered
itself a unity, divulgence of wiretapped conversa-
tions within the Department was not a divulgence
within the meaning of Section 605.57 There has
never been a legal test of this view, although it is
still endorsed by the Justice Department. This
interpretation seems to ignore the literal language
of the statute in forbidding publication to "any
person." If the Court were to technically construe
"divulgence" as they have "interception", the
Justice Department's position would be un-
tenable."
As a corollary of the Justice Department's in-
terpretation of Section 605, prosecutions of private
persons under the penal provision of the Federal
Communications Act" for violation of Section 605
have been rare. There seems to have been no re-
ported prosecution of a police officer for such vio-
lation. This situation is not surprising when it is
noted that the Department of Justice itself en-
gages in wiretapping and might be expected to
hesitate in prosecuting for activities in which it is
also involved. 0 Until 1957 there had been only one
67 This view has consistently been held. However, the
incidence of wiretapping by various bureaus has been
sporadic. For a history of the fluctuation of the Justice
Department policy see: Helfeld, A Study of Justice De-
partment Policies on Wire Tapping, 9 LAw. GumI Rxv.
57 (1949); Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE
L. J. 792 (1954); Brownell, Public Security and Wire
Tappini, 39 CoiNErL L. Q. 195 (1954). The Treasury
Department apparently holds a contrary view, Don-
nelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Con-
troversy, 63 YALE L. J. 802 (1954).
58 There is some dictum, however, supporting the
position of the Justice Department: "It seems to the
Court that obviously the deputy marshal did not
use the conversation for his own benefit. The phrase 'for
the benefit of another' naturally means for another
person. I do not think this included the Government,
and for that reason I do not believe that this clause is
applicable." United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970,
974 (D.D.C. 1950).
In addition to interception and divulgence the Act
forbids the unauthorized "use" of information obtained
by wiretapping. If the government indulges in wire-
tapping, it is logical to assume that it will in some way
use the information. This, too, would be in violation of
the statute.
0 48 Stat. 1100 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §501 (1958), pro-
vides for prosecution of violations of the Act and upon
conviction imposes a fine of not more than $10,000
and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.
0 Donnelly, supra note 57, at 802; Helfeld, supra
note 57 at 60. United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495
19601
